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LONG RUN TARGETS AND FOMC POLICY DECISIONS 
Susan B. Peterson* 
Monetarists have long been advising policy makers to conform policy 
decisions to a rule which would set the lon g-run monetary growth at a 
rate consistent with · real economic growth. The contention is that 
variability in th e r ate of growth of the money supply, combined with 
excessive rates of growth, result in economic havoc accompanied by high 
rates of inflation and that attempts to employ discretionary counter-
cyclical monetary policy are destabilizing. 
The monetarist viewpoint gained support in the 70' s as the pre-
dictions from Keynesian models became increasingly unreliable. To quote 
James Tobin: "Moneta rism won the hearts and minds of many econonists and 
most central bankers in the 70's." (10, p. 506 ) Evidence of the increasing 
acceptance of the monetarist viewpoint among legislators also, was the 
passage of House Concurrent Resolution 133 in 1975. In res ponse to the 
joint resolution the Federal Reserve began to announce publicly growth 
rate targets for monetary aggregates. With the passage of the Full 
Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, the requirement that the 
Federal Reserve specify long -run monetary aggregate targets to the 
Congress was mandated. The Federal Reserve fully complied with the 
legislation, but continued to operate on the basis of an interest rate 
target until the policy change of October 1979. This paper analyzes 
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monetary policy decisions in the years 1980-83 in an attempt to 
determine thE: weight given to meeting the announced long-run targets 
recognizing that departures from that goal might be deemed necessary by 
changing economic conditions. The first section briefly outlines the 
much talked about policy change in October 1979 which has been inter-
preted as a Fed commi trnent to the monetarists' desired ·policy. The 
second section delineates the models which were estimated to analyze 
policy decisions following the October 1979 policy change and to 
determine the extent to which policy was made in an attempt to meet the 
stated long-run targets. The empirical results from estimation of the 
models in section two are presented in the following section. The 
fourth section delineates a rationale for the observed policy behavior 
and the final section presents a conclusion. 
1. Details of the Policy Change 
On October 6, 1979, the announcement was made that the immediate 
target on the basis of which day-to-day policy decisions were made would 
shift from an interest rate target, the federal funds rate, to a mone-
tary aggregate target, non-borrowed reserves. During the federal funds 
rate regime, monetary aggregates played the role of the intermediate 
target, but the immediate target was the federal funds rate. The 
federal funds rate band was set at the level thought to be consistent 
with the stated long-run monetary targets. However, the narrowness of 
the band, ger,erally 50 to 100 basis points, indicated that stabilization 
of the interest rate was the primary goal of Fed policy. 
l-.s the rate of inflation rose steadily during the seventies, and 
inflatior;ary psychology became the mental attitude of even the 
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relatively uninfonned, the Federal Reserve came under severe attack for 
fu e ling inflation by allowing excessive rates of growth in the money 
supply. These conditions prompted the October 1979 change in operating 
procedures. The inte nded result of the change was to gain closer 
control over the growth of monetary aggregates. The "Record of Policy 
Actions of the FOMC" for the October 6 meeting opened with this 
statement: 
This meeting of the Committee was called by 
the Chairman .to consider actions that might 
be taken, in conjunction with actions being 
contemplated by the Board of Governors, to 
impr ove control over the expansion of money 
and bank credit in the light of developing 
speculative excesses in finan cial and commodity 
markets and additional evidence of strong 
inflationary forces in the economy. Special 
attention was given to the conduct of open 
market operations in order to contain growth 
in th e monetary aggregates within the ranges 
previously adopted by the Cormnittee for the 
year ending in the fourth quarter of 1979. (4, p. 472 ) 
Later in the "Record" the exact nature of the ac tions taken was 
delineated. 
Given th at objective, most members strongly 
supported a shift in th e conduct of open market 
operations to an approach placing emphasis on 
supplying the volume of bank reserves estimated 
to be consistent with the desired rates of growth 
in monetary aggregates, while pennitting much 
greater fluctuations in the federal funds rate 
than heretofore. [4, p. 974 ) 
Prior to October 1979, though monetary aggregates had been one 
target of concern to policy makers fro m as early as the beginning of 
1970, money market conditions, or movements in interest rates, were the 
par amount concern of policy makers [Wallich, 1979) . October 1979 marked 
the end of this regime. No l onger would policy be aimed at stabilizing 
the federal funds rate within a narrow band, rather the federal funds 
rate would be allowed to vary over a rnuch wider range, while non-
borrowed reserves were adjusted to meet long run growth targets . 
Immediately following the policy change, short run targets for 
monetary aggregat es , ralher than a narrow federal funds rate band, were 
stated as the primary objective for policy in the policy directive. A 
broad range for the federal funds rate band became written into the 
policy directive as a proviso, i.e., as a trigger mechanism for the 
reconvening of the FOMC, rather than as a day-to-day ope rating target. 
Also, the width of the band increased dramatically, to 400 basi~ points 
in the October directive. [4, p. 977] However, the change in policy was 
downplayed to some extent. A Federal Reserve staff report written in 
February 1981, evaluating the new monetary control procedure, asserted: 
The change in procedure, it should be pointed 
out represented a technical innovation rather 
than a change in the broader objectives of 
monetary policy or in the monetary targets 
themselves. (9, p. A-1] 
The statement pointed out that control of monetary aggregates was not a 
new policy objective, but due to the unsuccessful rec ord, a change in 
the method employed to meet those targets was deemed necessary. 
Volcker, in testimony before Congress said: 
our basic targets were not changed. But the 
new measures, which involved among other things 
a change in operating procedures should provide 
added assurance that those objectives will be 
re ached. Ill, p. 889] 
October 1979 is marked as a watershed in monet_ary policy. 
Apparently the Federal Reserve had decided to adopt a monetarist policy 
- to conform policy decisions to the attainment of the lon g-run monetary 
aggregate targets. Yet these long-run targets were not at t aind for 
either Mli or ~ during the following three years. The next section 
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proposes three models which are used to test the hypothe sis that the 
Federal Reserve did, in fact, announce short-run targets whfch would 
have made achievement of the long-run targets a reality if they had been 
attained. 
2. The Models 
The models used to analyze short run policy decisions assume that 
these decisions can be represented by the short run monetary growth 
targets as stated in the policy directive. These short run growth 
targets specified by the FOMC, unlike the monetary aggregates them-
selves, are left to the discretion of the FOMC. This guarantees that 
the Fed is, in fact, able to control the decision variable in this 
study. From the statements which surrounded the October 1979 policy 
change one would expect the short-run policy decisions of the FOMC to 
reflect a desire to meet long-run targets, i.e. , a monetarist policy 
strategy. In order to test the veracity of this expectation the models 
hypothesize that the stated short -ru n targets are set in an attempt to 
keep monetary growth in line with the stated l ong-run target with 
possible qualifications, i.e., partial adjustments to reflect changing 
economic conditions. Two estimating equations are derived from two 
different models which embody these assumptions. 1 
The first equation of the first model is: 
(.M* - M ) = 06\ - M ) + B:i_ crt - IE) + B..?<Yt -t-1 t - 1 t 
6-3 (Pt - PE) + e4 Ct\ - UE) + ~ t t 
where: 
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Mt-l = actual level of M-2 in preceding month 
Mt ,:::; long run target level for M-2 
I = federal funds rate 
1 
y = index of industrial production 
p = price level 
u = unemployment rate 
bar= long run desired value 
E = expected value 
tt~N(O,o 2 ) 
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a= partial adjustment coefficient for adjustment of the short run 
target to meet the long run target 
B's= adjustment coefficients for the various economic factors. 
This equation sup poses that the short-run target is set in response to 
deviations from the long run monetary target in the preceding period and 
expected deviations of key economic variables from the long-run desired 
levels for those variables in the current period . Equations 2a) - 2d) 
specify the expected values for the goal variables to be a function of 
the lagged value of that variable (times a growth rate where applicable) 
and of the difference between the actua l money supply and the expected 
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¢4 fM -' t 
(Mt-1 + g) J + u1t 2a) 
- (Mt-1 + g)) + u2 t 2b) 
(Mt- 1 + g) ) + u3t 2c) 
(Mt-1 + g)] + u4t 2d) 
where: 9 = constant incre ment , 
u 1234t ~ N(o,02), 
¢'s = ad j ustment coefficients reflecting adjustment in 
expe .cted values for economic variables due to 
unexpected deviations in the money supp l y, 
A= constant growth rate for income. 
All other variables are defined in equation 1). 
The third equatio n states that the money supply level i s equal t o the 
short run target plus an error term. 
Mt= Mt+ Vt 
where: Vt - N(O , o 2 ) 




Mt= a+ bl Mt+ b2 Mt - 1 + b3( 1t - It - 1 ) + b4 yt - bs yt - 1 - 4 > 
b6 p t -1 - b7 Ut- 1 + 0t 
where: 
bl = o./ !:, 
b2 = 1 - o. + f\~1 + 82~2 + 83¢3 + 844>4/li 
b 3 = 81/l:, 
b4 = 82/ 6 
bS = S2
V 6 
b6 = 83/6 
b 7 = 84/6 
6t = -vt( 8l¢l + 82¢2 + B34>3 + 84¢4 ) - ut(el + 82 + 83 + 84)/ 6 
6 = 1 + 81¢1 + $2¢2 + f 3 'P3 + 84¢4 
6 ~N(Oo2 ) 
t 
8 
Ut = constant 
A second model wa s also employed to test the same hypothesis . This 
1 
model used annualized percentage growth rates for the monetary control 
variab l es. This coincided exactly with the way in whi ch short run 
targets were stated by t he FOMC in the po l icy direct i ve. The first 
equation, depicting the ad j ustment hypothesis, was: 




SR*; annual percentage growth rat e stated a s the short ru n target 
t 
in the polic y directive 
LR*; mid point of the annual percentage gro wth rate state d as the 
t 
long run target in the policy directive 
a= pa rt i al adjustment coefficient, value <O indicating adjustm ent , 
and all other variables are defined as in the previous model . 
The next t wo equations of this model were specified exactly as equations 
2a) - 2d) and 3) in the fi r st model . Again, by substitution, an 
equation which could be estimated was derived: 
(SRt - LRf ) =a+ b 1Mt + b 2Mt- l + b 3Mt + b 4 (1t-l - It)+ 
+ bSYt +b6Yt - 1 + b7Pt - 1 + b8Ut-1 + y 
where : 
a = - 9(8 ¢> + 82¢2 + 83¢3 + B4¢4 ) - 84 Ut 1 1 
bl = - o 
b2 = (o - 81~1 - 62¢2 - e3¢3 - 84~ 4) 
b3 = 81 ¢1 + 82¢2 + B3¢>3 + 84¢4 
b4 = 81 
6 ) 
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bS = -B 2 
b = 
' 6 62). 
b7 = 63 
b8 = 64 
Y C vtc 81~1 + 82~2 + 83~3 + 84~4l + 61°1t + 62°2t + 83°3t + 
64°4t + E:t 
This model is similar to the first model, but, by using a different 
dependent variable, one which is measured in the same units as the 
stated policy , it acts as a check on the results of the first model. 
This second equation was estimated for the same time period as the 
first, and the results are reported in the next section. 
M- 2 was chosen as the monetary aggregate on which to focus for two 
major reasons. The first reason was that during t he period under study 
monetary aggregates were redefined twice. 4 This complicated the use of 
M-1 as the policy control variable. Also during the study period, 
institutional changes affected the weight attached t o M- 1 measures. For 
example , during the policy meeting on October 5, 1982, no short run 
target for M-1 was stated due to two institutional developments whos e 
effects on M- 1 were subject to great uncertainty. 5 However, it was fe l t 
that these developments would not lead to as much uncertainty surrounding 
M- 2. Therefore, because of the changes in measurement and the unc er tainty 
surrounding M-1, it was decided that the use of M-2, rather than M- 1, a s 
the policy decision variable was preferable. 
3. Empirical Results 
The two equations derived from the two models were both estimated 
for t he period January 1980 through October 1983 by ordinary l east 
squares. Detailed specification of the variables used is provided in 
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the data app en dix. Results from estimation _of the equation derived from 
the first 1110del, equation 4) , are reported in Table 1, and the results 
from equation 6) are reported in Table 2. 
I 
The results from the first model indicate that the Federal Open 
Market Committee, during the period under study, did not systematically 
adjust short-run targets, either to eliminate the gap between the actual 
level of M-2 and the midpoint of the long-run target, or in response to 
expected deviations of the ultimate goal variables from their - long-run 
desired values. In the first equation the estimated value of a, the 
adjustment coefficient indi cat ing adjustment to long-run target level is 
not significantly different from zero as b
1 
= a/ti was not significantly 
different from zero, and b
2 
= 1 - a + 8
1
~ 1 + 82~2 + e 3~3 + e4 ~4/ti is 
very close to one and significant at the 1 percent level. None of the 
adjustme nt coefficients on the economic variables is estimated to be 
significantly different from zero, as none of the coefficients b 3 
through b 7 was estim ated to be significantly different from zero at the 
5 percent level of significance. 







are statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level of significance. The analysis of these coefficients requires 
cognizance of the combinations of parameters from the multiequation 
model which comprise these coefficients. Recalling that: 
b2 = (o - el¢1 - 82~2 - 63~3 - 64~4) and 
b3 = S1¢1 + 62~2 + 83~3 + 84~4' 
we can analyze their estimated values. Obviously: b
2 
c a - b
3





approximately refle ct this expected relation-
ship as h
1 
= - a is not significantly differer,t from zero. Further 
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are significantly different from zero, it can be 
concluded that neither f\ , nor s
3
, nor B 
4 
are significantly different 




which accounts for 




• From the estimation of 
b
5 
= -B2 , B2 is estimated to be -.71. This coincides with the expec-
tation the e
2 
<O, i.e. , if the expected level of industrial production 
exceeds the target level the difference betwee n the short run monetary 
growth rate target, in terms of percent annualized growth, and the 
similar long run target should be negative. So, in contrast to the 
first model, this second model indicates so me responsiveness on the 
part of the FOMC to the level of industrial production, i.e., some 
degree of co untercycli cal behavior. Nevertheless, the magnitude is 
small, less than 1 percent difference in annualized terms. Going one 
step further, it i s obvious that from these e st imation s it must be 
concluded that ~
2 
is les s than zero. This implies that one• s expec-
tatio n of the index of industrial production in time "t" is lower than 
the previous period's ind ex times a con stant growth rate, if the 
actual level of the money supply in time "t" turns out to be greater 
than the expected level of the money supply. 
The important point with respect to the hypothesis being tested is 
th e f act that the conclusion from the first model is uphe ld by 
estimation of the secon d model. Again, b
1 
= -a, where o is the partial 
adjustment parameter, is not significantly different from zero.
6 
Both 
models indicate that short r un targets wer e not consistently set in 
order to meet t he previously specified long ru n targ ets . 
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The fact that the results from both models indicate that there was 
no consistent month-by-month reaction to the deviations in the goal 
variables from desired 7 levels was not too surprising. The FOMC 
considers many economic variables in the discussion which precedes 
policy decisions. The possibility that with a large number of indi-
cators being considered, any one might take on a varying weight from one 
policy decision to the next is certainly feasible. Also, the 
realization that policy decisions must be the consensus of a majority 
who may have differing perspectives, and who may weigh trade-offs 
differently, makes the lack o f systematic response to any one variable 
an expected outcome. On the other hand, the fact that short-run M-2 
targets are not set in response to the deviations of M-2 from the 
mid-point of its long-run target range was not expected, especially in 
the light of the fact that the policy change in October of 1979 was 
aimed at bringing monetary aggregates in line with targeted ranges. 
Because thes e results were inconsistent wi th Federal Reserve' s stated 
intent of the October 1979 policy change, the first model was 
simplified to test only the hypothesis that short-run M-2 targets were 
set in response to deviations of M-2 from the midpoint of the target 
range. The simpler mode l which was estimated was: 
where: a l l variables were defined as before. 
Estimation of this equatio n yielded : 
Mt* - M l: -.44(Mt - Mt-1) 
t- (-.34) 




Again, results from the estimation of equation 7 indicate that the 
short- run target was not adjusted in response to deviations from the 
midpoint of the long-run target. 
The somewhat 
f 
surprising conclusion that short-run targets, over 
which the Fed has control, ~re not adjusted with the intent of meeting 
long-run targets, over· which the Fed also has control, prompts one to 
seek some explanation for this policy behavior which apparently contra-
dicts the expected outcome based on the public statements of _policy-
makers during this period which appeared to reflect a commitment to a 
strict monetarist policy. 
4. A Rationale for Policy Behavior 
Thoug h it has been said, and Federal Reserve statements might be 
interpreted to indicate, that the Federal Reserve "turned monetarist" 
following the October 1979 policy change, the empirical evidence 
presented in this paper refutes this assertion. Justification of a 
non-monetarist po lic y is easily mustered. Reasons for not religiously 
foliowing a monetary aggregate target are not new to anyone familiar 
with the monetary policy area. Poole [1970) demonstrated that only in 
the case of a stable money demand function would targeting money tend to 
eliminate, ra ther than to exacerbate, fluctuations in output. lt is 
also widely recognized that attempts to decrease the variability in the 
money supply lead to increased variability in interest rates; i.e., 
there is a trade-off. In fact, the policy statement of 9ctober 1979 
asserted that the F.OMC had chose n to let interest rates vary more widely 
in order to control monetary aggregates more closely. 
From official Fede ra l Reserve statements, the deduction that the 
FOMC had t aken what Richard Davis, staff econo mis t, has labeled a 
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"practical monetarist" approach was a logical one. It appeared that the 
Fed agreed that: 
excessive monetary growth is a necessary 
condition for inflation and reduction in 
monetary growth as a necessary condition 
for restoring reasonable price stabil'ity.[2, p. 17) 
Nevertheless: FOMC members recognized that controlling monetary 
aggregates bears a cost: " rigorous control of money growth implies 
sacrifice of any ability to influence interest rates." [2, p. 23) 
Interest rate targeting had long been the central focus of Federal 
Reserve policy. But the cost of this preoccupation was loss of control 
over the money supply. However, theory teaches that deviations of 
monetary aggregates from target due to shifts in money demand should be 
accommodated rather than resisted: 
In theory, once unexpected deviations 
in money growth are known to represent 
genuine "shifts" in money demand, it will 
probably become appropriate to accommodate 
to them by readjusting money targets. [2, p. 25) 
But, even when deviations were large, there was no readjustment of long 
run money targets during the study period. 
For the years 1980, 1981, and 1982 actual M-2 growth exceeded the 
upper target, yet no adjustment in the long run target was made. Three 
reasons can be postulated for this phenomenon: first, the uncertainty 
surrounding the detennination of a "genuine shift"; second, the effect 
an alteration in the long-run targets would have on expectations; and 
third, the practice of the FOMC to rebase at the beginning'of each new 
year. The po l icy directive of October 5, 198 2 is a clear demonstration 
of the uncertainty surrounding monetary aggregates. Writing with 
respect to the short-run targets for M-2 and M-3 the directive stated: 
.•• somewhat slower growth bringing those 
aggregates around the upper part of the ranges 
set for the year would be acceptable and desirable 
in the context of declining interest rates. Should 
economic and financial uncertainties lead to 
exceptional 1iquidity demands, somewhat more rapid 
growth in the broader aggregates would be tolerated. 
(8, p. 766] 
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Both "somewhat slower" and "s omewhat more rapid growth" are regarded as 
tolerable depending on the unfolding of the uncertain future. Obviously, 
"genuine shifts" are not readily predictable. Expectations 
also play a key role in monetary policy, especially in an inflationary 
environment where expectations create an inflationary psychology which 
intensifies the problem. 
produced fears: 
Even raising short-run target growth rates 
Some sentiment was expressed for moderately 
faster monetary expansion. Pursuit of the 
latter policy course , it was suggested, would 
probably exacerbate inflationary expectations, 
especially in the light of the outlook for large 
deficits in the federal budget, and thereby exert 
upward pressure on interest rates. [7, p. 420] 
Finally, the fact that the Federal Reserve customarily (though for 1983 
the February-March average was used) uses . the average of the actual 
fourth quarter money figures as a base for the following year's policy 
removes the pressure to alter long-run target l evels, and to bring 
monetary aggregates into the targeted rang e as the year's end draws 
nigh. 
Rebasing is not the only aspect of policy behavior which indicates 
that perhaps targets are adjusted to actual values, rather than vice 
versa. After three years of M-2 growth in excess of the targeted range, 
the growth rate target for M-2 was increased. In the years 1980, 1981, 
and 1982 the targeted range for M-2 was 6\ to 9\ annual growth from the 
fourth quarter to the fourth quarter, but in 1983 the targeted range was 
... 
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7 percent to 10 percent annual growth from the February-March actual 
average to the fourth quarter. Not only did the percentage growth rate 
increase, but even the minimal discipline of rebasing on the fourth 
quarter average was rem~ved. The chance that M-2 would again overshoot 
the target was minimized and, in fact, M-2 did not overshoot. 
After considering the reasons for allowing monetary 6ggregates to 
deviate from target, the fact that there is no statistical evidence that 
short -run targets were set in response to deviations from long-run 
targets is not so surprising. What is surprising is the continued 
assertion that the "Fed has turned monetarist." 
5. Conclusion 
Monetarist theories have clearly gained acceptance in the recent 
past. Legislative action in the form of House Concurrent Resolution 
133, 1975, and the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill, 1978, have demonstrated that a 
majority of legislators lend credence to the monetarist assertion that 
monetary policy ought to be guided to some extent by monetary aggregate 
targeting. However, the empirical evidence presented in this paper 
indicates that the Federal Reserve is not convinced of the propriety of 
a strict monetarist policy. There are clearly qualifications to the 
efficacy of following such a policy. These have been examined. Rather, 
the evidence suggests that monetary policymakers recognize these 
qualifications and have chosen to follow a strategy of discretionary 
policy rather than be limited by strict monetarist rules. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. A nwnber of other models, of slightly different specifications were 
also tried in the course of the research. They yielded similar 
conclusions to the ones reported. 
2. Specific delineatien of the variables used in the estimation of the 
derived equations to follow is provided in the data appendix. 
3. The use of constant linear growth was chosen to coincide with 
Federal Reserve publications. Constant linear growth results in 
straight line graphs in monetary aggregate-time space. On the 
other hand, a constant growth rate would yielo straight line graphs 
in the natural log of the monetary aggregate-time space. Federal 
Reserve publications of monetary targets depict the target level as 
a straight line in monetary aggregate-time space, not log space. 
Obviously, constant linear growth reflects growth rates which are 
highest at the beginning of the year and decline throughout. The 
choice between frameworks is the choice between a change from month 
to month according to a constant increment, constant linear growth, 
and a change according to a constant percentage of the preceding 
month's observation. The Fed has opted for a constant increment 
change, constant linear growth, in all of its publications, so 
models which correspond with this procedure were used. However, an 
equation derived from a model which employed a constant growth rate 
was also estimated in the course of the research. This equation, 
linear in logarithms, yielded results similar to the reported 
results. 
4. For details see Federa l Reserve Bulletin, February 1980, pp. 98, 
99; February 1982, pp. 105-110. 
5. For details see Federal Reserve Bulletin, December 1982, pp. 
761-76 6 . 
6. The choice of an appropriate model depends to a large extent on the 
conformity of the error structure to the assumptions necessary to 
validate th e use of ordinary least squares. It should be noted 
th at the Durbin-Watson statistic from the second model does not 
allow one to reject serial correlation among the error terms, 
whereas the Durbin-Watson from the first model, though in the 
indeterminant range, is very close to the upper limit (1.78). 
Therefore, on the basis of an error structure criterion, the first 
model can be judged more credible. 
7. The exception is the quantitatively insignificant coefficient 
indicating some response to the level of the index of industrial 
production. 
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the policy directive. The midpoint 
of this percent growth rate plus one 
was multiplied by the stated base, 
the fourth quarter average in 1980, 
1961, and 1982 the February-March 
average in 1983, to get the next 
fourth quarter average. Monthly 
levels were extrapolated assuming 
constant linear growth. 
Federal Reserve Bulletin 
Statistical tables 
Midpoint of the targ et band as 
rep orted in the policy directive as 
re corded in "The Record of Policy 
1\ctions of the FOMC," Federal Reserve 
Bulletin. 
Calculated by assuming constant 
linear growth in the economy of 
3.3\ annual growth. 3.3\ was 
derived from average growth rates 
given by Edward J. Shapiro in 
Macroecon omic Analysis, Fourth 
Edition, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
Inc. , page 389. 
Actual va l ue from Federal Reserve 
Bul letin, statistical tables 
This variable was assumed to be 





Per cen tage change 
in CPI from the 
preceding period . 
Source 
Actual value from Fede ral 
Reserve Bulletin statistical 
tables 
This was assumed to be equal 
20 
Desired rate of 
civilian unem-
ployment 
to 61. (Any constant would yield 






Short run target 
for M-2 in percent 
annualized growth 
The midpo int of the 
long run targ et for 
M-2 in\ annualized 
growth 
Actual value from Federal 
Reserve Bulletin statistical 
tables. 
Taken from the Policy Directive 
Taken from the Policy Directive 
During the period under study, 39 FOMC meetings were held. The dates 
of the meeting are listed below. The statistical analysis was done for 
monthly observatio ns . Theref ore , t he variables from the policy 
directive did not exactly coincide with the mont hly observations of the 
other variables. For this reason it was assumed that if th ere were no 
policy meeting in a specific month the prev ious month's targets were 
still applicable. If the meeting occurred after the 15th of the month, 
the previous meeting's targets were used for that month while the newly-
decided-upon targets were used the following month. 
Dates of FOMC meetings: 10/6/79; 11/20/ 79; 3/18/80; 4/22/80; 
5/20/80; 7/9/80; 8/12/80; 9/16/80; 10/21/80; 11;18/8 0; 12/18-19/80; 
2/2-3/81; 3/31/81; 5/18/81; 7/16/81; 10/5-6/8 1 ; 11/1 7/8 1; 12/2 1-22/81; 
2/1-2/82; 3/29-30/82; 5/18/82; 6/30/82; 7/1/82; 8/24/82; 10/5/82; 
11/16 /82; 12/20-21/82; 2/8-9/83; 3/28-29/83; 5/24/83; 7/12-13/83; 
8/23/83; 10/4/83; 11/14-15/83; 12/19-20/83 
Table 1 
Empirical Results from Equation 4 
Equation: Mt= a+ blMt + b 2Mt-l + b 3 (It - It-l) + b~Yt - b 5Yt-l + 
+ b6Pt-i - b7Ut-l + 6t 
21 
Coefficient Independent Variable Estimate T Statistic 
a 
-2 
R = .9999 
N = 46 
ow= 1.75 
intercept 186. 702 
midpoint of the long -.029 
run target of M-2,level 
actual value of M-2, 1.08 
lagged, level 
difference between the .13 
midpoint of the designated 
federal funds rate band and 
the actual federal funds rate 
in the preceding period 
desired level of the index -1.69 
of industrial production 
the actual level of the index -.03 
of industrial production, 
lagged 
the percent change in the -1.48 
CPI from the preceding 
period, lagged 











Empirical Results from Equation 6 
Equation: (SR• - LR*)t ca+ blMt + b 2Mt-l + b 3Mt + b 4 (rt-l - It)+ 
b5Yt + b6Yt-1 + b7Pt-l + b8Ut-l + 6t 
22 
Coefficient Independent Variable Estimate T-statistic 
a 
-2 
R : .869 
DW : • 726 
N=46 
intercept -65.77 
midpoint of the long run .12 
target for M-2, level 
actual level of M-2, .70 
lagged 
short run target level .67 
for M"."2· 
difference between the .30 
actual federal funds rate, 
lagged and the midpoint of 
the target range 
desired level of the index .71 
of industrial production 
actual level of the index .03 
of industrial production, 
lagged 
percent change of the CPI - .13 
from the preceding period, 
lagged 
civilian unemployment rate, - .88 
lagged 
. -1.85 
- .30 
-13.52 
13.87 
- .48 
2.25 
- .70 
- .47 
- .21 
